Mindblind eyes: an absence of spontaneous theory of mind in Asperger syndrome by Senju, Atsushi et al.
 
 
 
BIROn - Birkbeck Institutional Research Online 
 
Enabling open access to Birkbeck’s published research output 
 
 
 
Mindblind eyes: an absence of spontaneous theory of 
mind in Asperger syndrome 
 
Journal Article 
 
 
http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/2566  
 
 
 
Version: Accepted (Refereed) 
 
 
Citation: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2009 AAAS 
 
 
 
Publisher version 
 
 
 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
All articles available through Birkbeck ePrints are protected by intellectual property law, including 
copyright law. Any use made of the contents should comply with the relevant law. 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
Deposit Guide 
 
Contact: lib-eprints@bbk.ac.uk 
Birkbeck ePrints 
Senju, A.; Southgate, V.; White, S.; Frith, U. (2009) 
Mindblind eyes: an absence of spontaneous theory of mind in Asperger 
syndrome 
Science 325 (5942), pp.883-885 
Mindblind eyes    1 
 
SCIENCE VOL 325 14 AUGUST 2009 PAGES 883-885 
 
Mindblind eyes: an absence of spontaneous Theory of Mind in Asperger 
Syndrome 
 
Atsushi Senju* a, Victoria Southgatea, Sarah Whiteb, and Uta Frithb c  
 
aCentre for Brain and Cognitive Development, Birkbeck, University of London, London, UK 
bInstitute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, London, UK 
cCFIN Aarhus University 
 
 
* Correspondence concerning this paper should be sent to Atsushi Senju, Centre for Brain 
and Cognitive Development, Birkbeck, University of London, Malet Street, London WC1E 
7HX, UK; Tel: +44 207 631 6895; Fax: +44 207 631 6587; E-mail: a.senju@bbk.ac.uk 
 
 
Abstract 
Adults with Asperger syndrome can understand mental states such as desires and beliefs 
(mentalizing) when explicitly prompted to do so, despite having impairments in social 
communication. We directly tested the hypothesis that such individuals nevertheless fail to 
mentalize spontaneously. To this end, we used an eye tracking task that has revealed the 
spontaneous ability to mentalize in typically-developing infants. We showed that, like infants, 
neurotypical adults’ (N = 17) eye movements anticipated an actor’s behaviour on the basis of 
her false belief. This was not the case for individuals with Asperger syndrome (N = 19). Thus, 
these individuals do not attribute mental states spontaneously, but may be able to do so in 
explicit tasks through compensatory learning. 
 
 
Impairment in reciprocal social interaction and communication is a core feature of 
Autism Spectrum Disorders, regardless of age and ability. This core feature is manifest in a 
wide range of social impairments, including characteristic deficits in comprehension and use 
of pretend play, expressive gestures, deception and irony (1). One influential account that can 
explain these varied and characteristic impairments proposes that they are a consequence of a 
failure in the neurologically-based capacity to ‘mentalize’, that is, the automatic ability to 
attribute mental states to self and others. The first evidence for this hypothesis, which is also 
known as a deficit in Theory of Mind or ‘mindblindness’ (2, 3), comes from the finding that 
children with autism fail the verbally instructed Sally-Ann False Belief Task (FBT), while 
four-year-old neurotypical children, and children with Down syndrome of similar verbal 
mental age, pass (4).  
In this task, considered a stringent-test of Theory of Mind (5), one character (Sally), 
places a marble in a basket and leaves the room. In her absence, another character (Ann) 
moves the marble to a box. When Sally returns, children are asked where she will look for 
her marble. If children understand that Sally’s actions will be based on what she believes to 
be true, rather than the actual state of affairs, they should answer that she will look in the 
basket, rather than the box. This correct answer requires the child to predict Sally’s behaviour 
based on her now false belief.  
Despite still exhibiting atypical social features characteristic of autism, individuals of 
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higher verbal ability, and in particular those with Asperger syndrome, can pass such False 
Belief attribution tasks (6-9). This competence presents a puzzle for the mindblindness 
hypothesis (10), and has prompted the proposal that these high ability individuals have 
acquired the ability to reason explicitly about false beliefs by compensatory learning, while 
difficulties in spontaneous mental states attribution may nevertheless persist (11). To date, 
there is only indirect evidence in support of this hypothesis (12-16). Here we seek to provide 
direct evidence by contrasting the ability to pass the standard FBT with spontaneous looking 
behaviour during a nonverbal form of this task.  
Spontaneous looking behaviour during a FBT scenario was used in a groundbreaking 
study by Onishi & Baillargeon (17), which exploited the fact that infants look longer at 
events that they do not expect. The authors showed that 15-month-old infants looked 
significantly longer when an actor searched in a location where an object was hidden that she 
could not know about, that is, when her behaviour was incongruent with her belief. Southgate, 
Senju & Csibra (18) extended this paradigm so that, rather than measuring whether young 
children look longer at unexpected outcomes, they measured whether children actually 
anticipate the outcomes before they happen. They designed a task that made it possible to 
assess directly whether children had an understanding of the content of an actors’ belief. 
Briefly, 25-month-old children were familiarized to an event in which a puppet hid a ball in 
one of two boxes (Figure 1A) and then an actor reached through one of two windows to 
retrieve the ball from the box (Figure 1C). Before she reached, a light and simultaneous 
chime signalled that the actor was about to open a window to retrieve the hidden object 
(Figure 1B). In the test trial the puppet transferred the ball from one box to another and then 
removed it altogether, while the actor was looking away (Figure 1D). An eye-tracker was 
used to assess whether children expected, by making anticipatory eye-movements, the actor 
to open the door, which would be consistent with her having a false belief about the location 
of the ball. Indeed the authors found that these typically developing children made eye 
movements towards the box, which was consistent with the actor’s belief about the location 
of the ball, despite the fact that it no longer contained the ball. These children, who would not 
be able to perform the traditional verbally instructed FBT, thus correctly anticipated the 
actor’s behaviour in line with her false belief.  
 
 
 
It is this task that we used for the present study (see also Movies S1 and S2). We asked 
Figure 1. Selected scenes from stimulus 
movies (see also Movies S1 and S2). In 
familiarization trials, participants were 
familiarized to an event in which (A) the 
puppet placed a ball in one of two boxes 
(B) both windows were illuminated and a 
chime sounded, and (C) an actor reached 
through the window above the box in 
which the ball was placed, and retrieved 
the ball. The participants were 
familiarized to the contingency between 
(B) and (C). In (D), the puppet moves the 
ball while the actor is looking away. This 
operation induces a false belief in the 
actor about the location of the ball. 
Mindblind eyes    3 
 
whether or not adults with Asperger syndrome would, through their anticipatory looking, 
reveal a similar spontaneous capacity for false belief attribution. At the same time we had to 
establish that neurotypical adults would show the same anticipatory looking as young 
children. Prior to the main analyses, we confirmed that all the participants showed 
anticipatory looking towards the correct location during familiarization trials (19). Written 
informed consent was obtained from each participant before the study began. The study was 
approved by the UCL Research Ethics Committee.  
 
Table 1. Mean Chronological Age (CA), verbal IQ (VIQ), performance IQ (PIQ), full scale 
IQ (FIQ) (WAIS-III UK), composite Theory of mind score (ToM), Strange Story test 
score (SS), scores of Autism Quotient (AQ) and Autism Diagnostic Observation 
Schedule - Generic (ADOS-G). 
 
GROUP Asperger Syndrome Neurotypical 
 Mean SD range Mean SD range 
CA 36.8 14.3 21-67 39.6 11.7 26-63 
VIQ 116.8 14.4 85-144 116.1 13.2 91-138 
PIQ 109.6 13.0 80-132 111.5 10.6 97-132 
FIQ 115.6 14.9 89-144 115.3 11.0 95-129 
ToM1 9.7 2.0 4-13.5 10.6 1.3 8.5-12.5 
SS2 13.2 1.8 10-16 13.6 1.3 12-16 
AQ3 34.9 7.6 17-48 16.5 7.6 6-37 
ADOS-G 7.9 4.7 0-17 - - - 
 
1The ToM tests consisted of five first-order false belief tests (Sally-Ann: (4); Smarties: (23); 
Interpretational false belief: (24); Belief-emotion and Real-apparent emotion: (25)) and two second-order false 
belief tests (Ice Cream Van: (26); Coat Story: (6)).  
2The Strange Stories were taken from (27), and required the participant to either interpret another’s 
behaviour or understand another’s emotion.  
3AS and NT groups differed significantly on the Autism-Spectrum Quotient confirming their diagnostic 
status (AQ: (28), (t(34) = 7.23, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 2.41, t-test). No other variables were significantly different 
between the two groups. 
 
 As shown in Table 1 The Asperger and Neurotypical groups in our study were very 
similar in age and IQ. As no sex differences were shown in any of our measures, we pooled 
results over gender in each group. We found that the participants with Asperger syndrome 
performed as did neurotypical adults on verbally instructed versions of a variety of standard 
Theory of mind (ToM) tests, including the previously described Sally-Anne Task. There were 
no group differences in the composite ToM score or in the Strange Stories (both ts < 1.61, 
both ps > .1, t-test). Crucially all participants with Asperger syndrome passed the two 
standard False Belief Tests. 
However, the Eye-Tracking version of the FBT revealed a very different picture. We 
used Differential Looking Times (DLS; (20)) considered a highly reliable measure of looking 
bias, (e.g. (21, 22)) compiled over a 6 second period (19). The Asperger group showed 
significantly less looking bias towards the correct window than did the neurotypical group 
(Figure 2A, main effect of group: F(1, 32) = 4.93, p = .003, ηp2 = 0.13, ANOVA). Follow-up 
t-tests revealed that the neurotypical group scored significantly above zero (mean = 0.42, 
t(16) = 2.76, p = .014, Cohen’s d = 0.67, t-test), meaning that they showed a significant bias 
towards the correct target, in line with the actor’s false belief. This was not the case for the 
Asperger group, whose bias did not differ from zero (mean: -0.001, t(18) = -.010, p = .99, 
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Cohen’s d = 0.002, t-test).  
We also coded the direction of first saccade (Figure 2B). Here 13 out of 17 
neurotypical participants made their first eye movement towards the correct location, which 
was significantly above chance (p = .049, binominal test). In contrast, only 8 out of 19 
individuals in the Asperger group made a correct saccade first, but this did not significantly 
differ from chance (p = .647, binominal test). These results are consistent with the 
Differential Looking Score reported above. However, the first saccade, which represents a 
broad categorical response, did not differentiate significantly between the groups (p = .30, 
Fisher's exact-test, two-tailed). 
 
 
 
Could our results be due to gaze abnormalities in the Asperger group? Note that they 
could not be due to an avoidance of eye gaze since the actor’s eyes were hidden beneath a 
visor. However, the duration of fixations to the actor’s face were significantly shorter in the 
Asperger group (mean: 1.9s) than in the neurotypical group (mean: 3.1s) (t(34) = -2.48, p 
= .018, Cohen’s d = 0.827, t-test). This was not due to overall shorter fixations in the 
Asperger group, as the duration of fixations toward the windows (correct and incorrect 
combined) did not differ between groups (mean: 2.5s in Asperger group and 1.9s in 
neurotypical group, t(34) = 1.53, p = .14, Cohen’s d = 0.506, t-test). Importantly, the 
correlation between DLS and the duration of face fixation was not significant in either the 
Asperger or neurotypical group. Furthermore, total time spent looking at the five regions of 
interest (face, two windows and two boxes) did not differ between groups (4.8s in Asperger 
group and 5.1s in neurotypical group, see supporting online text for further details). Thus, the 
lack of bias towards the ‘correct’ target in the Asperger group is not explained by gaze 
abnormalities.  
This study demonstrated that adults with Asperger Syndrome do not spontaneously 
anticipate others’ actions in a non-verbal task, closely modeled on the standard FBT which 
they pass with ease. In particular, the contrast with neurotypical two-year-olds who show 
spontaneous looking to the correct location on the same task (18) is striking. It is unlikely that 
differences in motivation are to blame since neurotypical adults showed the same bias as 
typically-developing children, and the Asperger group exhibited correct anticipatory looking 
on familiarization trials when no belief reasoning was required. The current results confirm 
indirect indications (12-15) that individuals with Asperger Syndrome have a persistent 
impairment in spontaneous mentalizing and are also consistent with a previous finding (16) 
that children with autism are more likely to give a correct verbal answer than a correct 
anticipatory look, when asked to infer someone’s preference. 
Although it is plausible that the documented early emerging spontaneous capacity to 
mentalize (17, 18) is a prerequisite for the later ability to justify behaviour in terms of mental 
states in verbal tasks, our results suggest that this need not necessarily be the case. Instead, 
our data raise the surprising possibility that an early developing form of the cognitive ability 
to mentalize, evident in spontaneous looking behaviour, is not a necessary precursor of the 
Figure 2. (A) Mean (± SEM) difference looking scores 
(DLS, (19)) and (B) the ratio of the number of participants 
who made correct first saccades in each group. AS: 
participants with Asperger Syndrome (N = 19), NT: 
neurotypical participants (N = 17), *: p < .05, **: p < .01, 
dotted lines: chance level, statistical test used: (A) t-test 
and (B) binominal test. 
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later developing form of mental state attribution, which supports explicit reasoning. The 
former would require spontaneous encoding of socially relevant information and automatic 
on-line computation of others’ mental states, whereas the latter could also be achieved by 
verbally mediated reasoning prompted by explicit task structure and instructions. 
More boldly, we suggest that compensatory learning can circumvent 
neurophysiological limitations, even without removing the original cause of the limitation. 
Such compensatory learning might explain the apparent paradox between success on explicit 
false belief tasks and continued difficulty in everyday social interaction in individuals with 
Asperger syndrome. 
 
 
REFERENCES AND NOTES 
 
1. U. Frith, Autism: Explaining the Enigma.  (Blackwell, Oxford, ed. 2nd, 2003). 
2. S. Baron-Cohen, Mindblindness : An essay on autism and theory of mind. .  (MIT 
Press., Cambridge, MA, 1995). 
3. U. Frith, Neuron 32, 969 (2001). 
4. S. Baron-Cohen, A. M. Leslie, U. Frith, Cognition 21, 37 (1985). 
5. D. Dennett, Behav. Brain Sci. 4, 568 (1978). 
6. D. M. Bowler, J. Child Psychol. Psychiatry 33, 877 (1992). 
7. F. G. Happé, Child Dev. 66, 843 (1995). 
8. C. C. Peterson, V. P. Slaughter, J. Paynter, J. Child Psychol. Psychiatry 48, 1243 
(2007). 
9. S. G. Shamay-Tsoory, J. Autism Dev. Disord. 38, 1451 (2008). 
10. A. Klin, W. Jones, R. Schultz, F. Volkmar, D. Cohen, Am. J. Psychiatry 159, 895 
(2002). 
11. U. Frith, J. Child Psychol. Psychiatry 45, 672 (2004). 
12. F. Abell, F. Happé, U. Frith, Cogn. Dev. 15, 1 (2000). 
13. A. Klin, J. Child Psychol. Psychiatry 41, 831 (2000). 
14. F. Castelli, C. Frith, F. Happé, U. Frith, Brain 125, 1839 (2002). 
15. R. K. Kana, T. A. Keller, V. L. Cherkassky, N. J. Minshew, M. A. Just, Soc. Neurosci. 
4, 135 (2009). 
16. T. Ruffman, W. Garnham, P. Rideout, J. Child Psychol. Psychiatry 42, 1083 (2001). 
17. K. H. Onishi, R. Baillargeon, Science 308, 255 (2005). 
18. V. Southgate, A. Senju, G. Csibra, Psychol. Sci. 18, 587 (2007). 
19. Materials and methods are available as supporting material on Science Online. 
20. A. Senju, G. Csibra, Curr. Biol. 18, 668 (2008). 
21. V. Corkum, C. Moore, Dev. Psychol. 34, 28 (1998). 
22. H. M. Wellman, S. Lopez-Duran, J. LaBounty, B. Hamilton, Dev. Psychol. 44, 618 
(2008). 
23. J. Perner, S. R. Leekam, H. Wimmer, Br. J. Dev. Psychol. 5, 125 (1987). 
24. T. Luckett, S. D. Powell, D. J. Messer, M. E. Thornton, J. Schulz, J. Autism Dev. 
Disord. 32, 127 (2002). 
25. H. M. Wellman, D. Liu, Child Dev. 75, 523 (2004). 
26. J. Perner, H. Wimmer, J. Exp. Child Psychol. 39, 437 (1985). 
27. P. C. Fletcher et al., Cognition 57, 109 (1995). 
28. S. Baron-Cohen, S. Wheelwright, R. Skinner, J. Martin, E. Clubley, J. Autism Dev. 
Disord. 31, 5 (2001). 
29.  We would like to thank Devorah Coniston for her invaluable help in data collection, 
Mindblind eyes    6 
 
and Gergely Csibra and Chris Frith for their helpful discussions. AS was supported 
by an ESRC Research Fellowship (RES-063-27-0207); SW by an MRC/ESRC 
fellowship (PTA 037-27-0107) and UF by a MRC grant (G0701484) and the Aarhus 
Research Foundation. 
 
Supporting Online Material 
www.sciencemag.org 
Materials and Methods 
Supporting Text 
Movies S1, S2 
 
